United lost $1 billion in market cap this week because an old news article being mistaken for a fresh article. As a graduate student, I collected stories about flaws related to integrity and freshness of content --- ranging from news stories to software updates --- because of my interests in engineering secure file systems. But it's not the first time that a flaw related to freshness of content has affected the stock of a company. Emulex lost $2.5 billion in market cap because a hoax eight years ago. Here's a screenshot to remind you.
The United incident might be an unintentional accident rather than a security problem. But try to explain the difference between security and robustness to jittery investors who count on the integrity and freshness of information to make important decisions.
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Thursday, July 03, 2008
Automated Fast Food Error Messages
Errors messages when ordering fast food at an airport? Have your error message Your Way! When I saw this blue screen of death, I had to try this novel payment system at Burger King. Sadly, the chain hired a cashier to sit next to the automated ordering system. She physically swiped the card and pressed the buttons for me. Hopefully in the future such intervention will not be necessary, but the machines must not be too robust. Windows.
Japan has already mastered the art of automated payment. There are some ramen restaurants where a customer would never even see eye-to-eye with a wait staff member. Here's an example from a ramen restaurant I tried in Fukuoka. Most restaurants have automated kiosks to order food.
Japan has already mastered the art of automated payment. There are some ramen restaurants where a customer would never even see eye-to-eye with a wait staff member. Here's an example from a ramen restaurant I tried in Fukuoka. Most restaurants have automated kiosks to order food.
Table-side Credit Card Readers
At Legal Seafoods in Washington Reagan Airport, I had my first experience with table-side credit cards in the USA.
Table-side credit card readers are popular in Europe. Instead of swiping a credit card at the counter, the customer is provided a self-contained unit at the table. The idea is to reduce fraud by wait staff (e.g., surreptitious extra swipes). But not all wait staff are comfortable with table-side units because of the culture of American dining. The user interface is clumsy. When wait staff add their own annotated buttons to a machine, you know that the user interface was not designed well. Read more about table-side credit cards from another blog.
Table-side credit card readers are popular in Europe. Instead of swiping a credit card at the counter, the customer is provided a self-contained unit at the table. The idea is to reduce fraud by wait staff (e.g., surreptitious extra swipes). But not all wait staff are comfortable with table-side units because of the culture of American dining. The user interface is clumsy. When wait staff add their own annotated buttons to a machine, you know that the user interface was not designed well. Read more about table-side credit cards from another blog.
Monday, June 09, 2008
Saturday, April 26, 2008
Crummy cookie authentication schemes
Ever wonder what happens after you log in with a password on a Web site like Blogger, Facebook, banks, shopping Web sites, and such? Often the Web server sets a cookie that essentially says, "Hi. This user already authenticated with a password, so don't bother to ask for the password when the user clicks on the next restricted Web page." This feature is incredibly convenient. Can you imagine typing your password each time you click on a different Web page? That would be unbelievably cumbersome.
Unfortunately, it's amazingly difficult to design a secure Web authentication scheme. Even the experts can mess up. Sometimes the flaws in a cookie authentication scheme can let an intruder bypass the password check entirely. In 2001, I published a USENIX Security paper that attempted to classify the flaws in various Web authentication schemes, discover the root causes of the flaws, and find ways to avoid the flaws. Yesterday, Steven J. Murdoch proposed a solution to fix a vulnerability he discovered in the Wordpress cookie authentication scheme. Further information appears in Murdock's paper and slides. The vulnerability permits an attacker to gain administrative access, and resulted from a type of "cryptographic splicing" flaw that was discussed in the USENIX Security paper and the more comprehensive technical report. Nearly seven years after these publications and the CACM Risks column, the same types of problems keep popping up.
Is there a perfect solution for secure Web authentication based on cookies? No, but we can learn from our mistakes. Designers of security-sensitive Web applications should read up on their history before repeating the mistakes of yore. Not everyone is a Steven J. Murdoch; Web application developers should rely on designs and code from folks like Murdoch rather than risking the design or implementation of a flawed scheme. But even then, be wary of putting too much faith in a cookie authentication scheme.
Unfortunately, it's amazingly difficult to design a secure Web authentication scheme. Even the experts can mess up. Sometimes the flaws in a cookie authentication scheme can let an intruder bypass the password check entirely. In 2001, I published a USENIX Security paper that attempted to classify the flaws in various Web authentication schemes, discover the root causes of the flaws, and find ways to avoid the flaws. Yesterday, Steven J. Murdoch proposed a solution to fix a vulnerability he discovered in the Wordpress cookie authentication scheme. Further information appears in Murdock's paper and slides. The vulnerability permits an attacker to gain administrative access, and resulted from a type of "cryptographic splicing" flaw that was discussed in the USENIX Security paper and the more comprehensive technical report. Nearly seven years after these publications and the CACM Risks column, the same types of problems keep popping up.
Is there a perfect solution for secure Web authentication based on cookies? No, but we can learn from our mistakes. Designers of security-sensitive Web applications should read up on their history before repeating the mistakes of yore. Not everyone is a Steven J. Murdoch; Web application developers should rely on designs and code from folks like Murdoch rather than risking the design or implementation of a flawed scheme. But even then, be wary of putting too much faith in a cookie authentication scheme.
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